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Handcuffing Justice: The Shaky Empirical
Foundations of the Feeney Amendment
Max Matthew Schanzenbach
Abstract
The United States Sentencing Guidelines greatly restrict the sentencing discre-
tion traditionally vested in district court judges. Since their adoption in 1987,
federal judges have criticized the Guidelines more sharply than any other federal
law. In 2003, Congress overwhelmingly passed the PROTECT Act. The Feeney
Amendment to the Act, added late in the process, imposed further restrictions on
judicial discretion in sentencing. Supporters of the Amendment argued that fed-
eral district court judges were increasingly departing below the ranges specified
in the Sentencing Guidelines. Using data on all federal criminal sentences be-
tween 1993 and 2001, this essay argues that the empirical evidence put forward
in support of the Feeney Amendment was deeply flawed. While the rate of down-
ward departures increased, much of the increase can be explained by a number
of potentially relevant variables such as type of offense, the offense level, district
of sentencing, and offender characteristics. In addition, even though downward
departures were more frequent, total prison sentences did not change during this
time period because departures were smaller in magnitude. I find no evidence
that the increasing number of Democratic appointees on the federal district court
bench affected prison sentences or downward departures. Most importantly, there
is no evidence to support the argument that judges were ignoring the Sentencing
Guidelines. The percentage of prison sentences explained by explicit Guidelines
factors changed little over the time period. I conclude that the radical reform
undertaken by Congress was poorly informed.
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Abstract 
 
 
The Feeney Amendment to the PROTECT Act of 2003 restricted judicial 
discretion to make downward departures.  Supporters of the Amendment argued that 
federal district court judges were increasingly departing below the ranges specified in the 
Sentencing Guidelines, reducing sentences and increasing sentencing disparities.  Using 
data on all federal criminal sentences between 1993 and 2001, this article argues that 
federal sentencing practices did not change appreciably over the relevant time period.  
First, while the rate of downward departures increased, much of the increase can be 
explained by a number of potentially relevant variables such as type of offense, the 
offense level, district of sentencing, and offender characteristics.  Second, even though 
downward departures were more frequent, average total prison sentences hardly changed.  
Third, there is no evidence that the increasing number of Democratic appointees on the 
federal district court bench affected average prison sentences or the rate of downward 
departures.  Finally, the influence of guidelines factors on prison sentences has remained 
constant.   
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Since their adoption in 1987, federal judges have criticized the United States 
Sentencing Guidelines more sharply than any other federal law.  Many scholars have also 
had a harsh assessment, attacking the Guidelines for their rigidity and severity,1 for their 
limitations on judicial discretion,2 and for placing more discretion in the hands of federal 
prosecutors.3  Others, however, believe that the Guidelines’ restriction of judicial 
discretion reduced unwarranted sentencing disparities, increasing fairness and certainty 
by ensuring that like offenders receive similar sentences.4 
In 2003, Congress overwhelmingly passed the PROTECT Act (“The Prosecutorial 
Remedies and Tools Against the Exploitation of Children Today Act of 2003”).5  The Act 
was ostensibly passed to enhance punishments for child victim crimes, particularly sex 
                                                
1 Kate Stith & Steve Y. Koh, The Politics of Sentencing Reform: The Legislative History of the Federal 
Sentencing Guidelines, 28 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 223, 284 (1993) (concluding that, for the most part, the 
"rigidity and harshness," of the Guidelines were mandated or encouraged by Congress). 
2 See, e.g., Kate Stith & Jose A. Cabranes, FEAR OF JUDGING: SENTENCING GUIDELINES IN THE FEDERAL 
COURTS (1998). 
3 See, e.g., id. at 130-42; Albert W. Alschuler, The Failure of the Sentencing Guidelines: A Plea for Less 
Aggregation, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 901, 926 (1991) ("The sentencing reform movement has not restricted 
sentencing discretion so much as it has transferred discretion from judges to prosecutors.").  See also 
Margareth Etienne, Remorse, Responsibility, and Regulating Advocacy: Making Defendants Pay for the 
Sins of Their Lawyers, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 2103, 2122-28 (2003) (arguing that the acceptance of 
responsibility adjustments deters defense lawyers from zealous advocacy for fear of losing the benefits of 
the departure, benefiting the prosecution).   
4 For academic defenses of the Guidelines, see, e.g., John Gleeson, Supervising Federal Capital 
Punishment: Why the Attorney General Should Defer When U.S. Attorneys Recommend Against the Death 
Penalty, 89 VA. L. REV. 1697, 1702 (2003) (noting that under the Guidelines, sentencing “is transparent, 
certain, and based on reasons that are explained and subject to appellate review” while also stating that the 
Guidelines are needlessly complex); Frank O. Bowman, III, The Quality of Mercy Must Be Restrained, and 
Other Lessons in Learning to Love the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 1996 WIS. L. REV. 679, 748 (1996) 
(arguing that the limitation of “judicial discretion is . . . a beneficial result” of the Guidelines and that an 
increase in prosecutorial discretion is “no cause for alarm").  For a judge’s defense of the Guidelines, see 
Hon. Patti B. Saris, Below the Radar Screens: Have the Sentencing Guidelines Eliminated Disparity? One 
Judge's Perspective, 30 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 1027, 1054 (1997) (arguing that the Guidelines promote a 
more “deliberate, fair, and rational” sentencing process than the old regime of discretion and discussing 
possible disparities remaining because of substantial assistance downward departures).   
5 Pub. L. 108-21, 117 Stat. 650 (2003) (codified in scattered §§ of 18 U.S.C.) (hereinafter “PROTECT 
Act”).  The vote on the final version of the act was 98-0, in the Senate, 149 CONG. REC. S5156 (daily ed. 
Apr. 10, 2003) and 400-25 in the House, 149 CONG. REC. H3075-76 (daily ed. Apr. 10, 2003).   
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crimes.  Through the Feeney Amendment,6 the PROTECT Act grew to be the first major 
reform of sentencing since the Guidelines’ implementation.7  The Amendment includes 
provisions substantially limiting the sentencing discretion of federal judges for all 
categories of crime.  Most controversially, the Amendment requires judges to make 
extensive reports of their sentencing decisions, which will be made available to the 
Justice Department and Congress.   
While the legislative history of the Feeney Amendment is somewhat opaque, 
those who backed the Amendment clearly argued that downward departures from ranges 
specified by the Guidelines were (1) increasingly common; (2) were the result of an 
overly lenient federal judiciary; and (3) had led to an increase in sentencing disparities.8 
This article explores the empirical assumptions of the Feeney Amendment.  I test 
these assumptions in several ways, using data on all federal criminal sentences from 1993 
to 2001.  First, I examine trends in departure rates, both raw rates and the rates 
conditional on a number of sentencing factors, to determine if departure rates have in fact 
increased.  Second, I examine trends in prison sentences to determine if changes in 
downward departure rates had an impact on the total level of punishment.  Finally, I 
consider whether the influence of the Guidelines on total prison sentences changed in this 
period.  If judges circumvent the Guidelines by departing, then the Guidelines should 
become less influential.  I also consider the impact of the changing political composition 
of the federal bench on sentencing. 
                                                
6 Named for its sponsor, freshman Republican Representative Tom Feeney of Florida. 
7 Another major change to the Guidelines, some of it perhaps unintended, has come in the form of the 
Sarbanes-Oxely Act.  For a discussion, see Frank O. Bowman, Pour Encourager les Autres? The Curious 
History and Distressing Implications of the Criminal Provisions of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the 
Sentencing Guidelines Amendments that Followed, 1 OHIO ST. CRIM. L. J. 373 (2004). 
8 For a full discussion of the origins and the particulars of the Feeney Amendment, see The Feeney 
Amendment: Roots and Reactions, 15 FEDERAL SENTENCING REPORTER (June 2003).  
Deleted: the 
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The results of this analysis contradict most of the empirical assumptions of the 
Feeney Amendment.  First, downward departures increased over the 1990s, but not to the 
extent claimed by supporters of the Amendment when other factors (such as the 
characteristics of the crime and offender) are considered.   Second, average prison 
sentences did not change much despite the increase in the rate of downward departures.   
Third, the influence of explicit Guidelines factors on the total prison sentence remained 
roughly the same over this period.   This suggests that judges were not ignoring the 
Guidelines and that concerns about sentencing “disparities” were overwrought.  Finally, I 
find no conclusive evidence that the increasing number of Democratic appointees on the 
bench affected prison sentences or downward departures. 
The first part of the article describes the federal Sentencing Guidelines, the 
changes the Feeney Amendment made, and the Amendment’s legislative history.  The 
second part of the article provides a brief overview of the large empirical literature on 
judicial decision-making.  The third part describes the data, and the fourth part discusses 
the methodology and results.   
I. THE UNITED STATES SENTENCING GUIDELINES AND THE FEENEY 
AMENDMENT 
Given the high stakes involved in criminal sentencing, both for society and those 
being sentenced, it is not surprising that judicial discretion in sentencing has come under 
attack.  Indeed, the concept of limiting judicial discretion in sentencing has found 
considerable support in Congress.  The Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, which 
authorized the Sentencing Commission to develop the Sentencing Guidelines, was passed 
Hosted by The Berkeley Electronic Press
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with near unanimity as part of an omnibus spending bill.9  The PROTECT Act was the 
first major Congressional revision of the Guidelines.  Passed by an overwhelming vote in 
late 2003, it further restricted judicial discretion.10    
a. The Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 
Prior to the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, federal district court judges had 
substantial sentencing discretion within the broad limits set by statutory minimum and 
maximum sentences.  In addition, their sentences could not, as a general matter, be 
appealed.  The elimination of sentencing disparities caused by unfettered discretion was 
the primary motive behind the Act and the creation of the United States Sentencing 
Commission.  The Act charged the Commission to develop sentencing guidelines that 
would “provide certainty and fairness in meeting the purposes of sentencing, avoiding 
unwarranted disparities among defendants with similar records who have been found 
guilty of similar criminal conduct.”11   
                                                
9 Pub. L. 98-473, Title II, § 212(a)(2), 98 Stat. 1988 (1984), codified in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C.  See 
also 18 U.S.C.A. § 3551 notes. 
10 See infra pp. 7-9. 
11 28 U.S.C. § 991(b). Whether the Guidelines decreased sentencing disparity remains something of an 
open question.  Hofer et al. (1999) concluded that the Guidelines slightly decreased inter-judge sentence 
disparities.  Paul J. Hofer, Kevin R. Blackwell, & R. Barry Ruback, The Effect of the Federal Sentencing 
Guidelines on Inter-judge Sentencing Disparity, 90 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 239, 289 (1999).  
Anderson et al. found a decrease in inter-judge disparities in sentence length after the Guidelines, yet 
cautioned that the advent of mandatory minimum sentences might have contributed to the decline and 
substantial discretion had been transferred to prosecutors.  John M. Anderson et al., Measuring Interjudge 
Sentencing Disparity: Before and After the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 42 J. L. & ECON. 271, 303-04  
(1999).   On the other hand, Lacasse and Payne measured changes in inter-judge disparity by examining 
whether plea bargain strategies changed after the Guidelines. Chantale Lacasse & A. Abigail Payne, 
Federal Sentencing Guidelines and Mandatory Minimum Sentences: Do Defendants Bargain in the Shadow 
of the Judge? 42 J. L. & ECON. 245 (1999).  If inter-judge disparities truly decreased under the Guidelines, 
Lacasse and Payne reasoned, the judge assigned to a case should have less influence on the decision to plea 
and on the substance of the plea agreement than before.  Yet the authors conclude that judge-specific 
effects on plea bargains remained actually increased post-Guidelines, implying that prosecutors and defense 
attorneys believed that judges matter as much after the Guidelines as before.  Id. at 267-68. 
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Pursuant to this legislative directive, the Sentencing Commission developed a 
sentencing table, which is reproduced in Appendix Figure 1.  The “recommended” range 
is determined by the offense level and criminal history category.  A district judge, with 
the aid of the probation officer, uses the Sentencing Commission’s regulations to 
calculate the defendant’s numeric “offense level.”  The crime of conviction sets the 
“base” offense level, with levels being added or subtracted based on a variety of factors, 
such as the use of a gun, the use of sophisticated means in a fraud, whether a financial 
institution was affected, whether the offender played a major or minor role in the crime, 
acceptance of responsibility, etc.  The offender’s criminal history category is calculated 
based on the prior offenses committed by the offender.  These two factors yield a 
sentencing range expressed in months.  All of these determinations are subject to 
appellate review.12   
Provided the offense level and criminal history have not been miscalculated, a 
sentence within the specified range cannot be reversed.13  As can be seen from Figure 1, 
the sentencing range is roughly 25% of the total sentence.14      
The Sentencing Reform Act authorized judges to depart from the calculated 
sentencing range if there is an “aggravating or mitigating circumstance of a kind, or to a 
degree, not adequately taken into consideration by the sentencing commission in 
formulating the Guidelines that should result in a sentence different from that 
described.”15  Under the Act, a judge must justify a departure by making a statement in 
                                                
12 18 U.S.C. § 3553(e). 
13 18 U.S.C. § 3742. 
14 While the offense levels and criminal history categories were ultimately determined by the Sentencing 
Commission, the Sentencing Reform Act mandated that sentencing ranges be 25% of the maximum 
guideline range.  18 U.S.C. § 994(b)(2). 
15 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b); see also U.S.S.G. § 5K.2.0 (Policy Statement). 
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open court or in a written opinion.16  The United States can appeal a downward departure, 
and the defendant can appeal an upward departure.17   
The Guidelines themselves generally discourage downward departures.  They list 
few grounds for downward departures relating to the crime itself, e.g., victim culpability, 
legal justification, coercion, diminished capacity, and voluntary abandonment.18  A 
number of offender characteristics may serve as grounds for downward departures, but 
they are discouraged.  Age, educational attainment, and family responsibilities are not 
“ordinarily relevant” considerations in departures, but they may be considered if the 
circumstances are sufficiently unusual.19  In 1991, the Commission made clear that health 
and prior good works (including military service) were “not ordinarily relevant” to 
departure considerations.20  Also in the early 1990s, a number of circuits explicitly 
recognized the “aberrant act” departure, which holds that a departure may be granted on 
the grounds that the crime of conviction represents an act that the defendant is not prone 
to commit.21   
In 1994, the Commission made clear that factors “not ordinarily” relevant can still 
be considered in departure decisions if they remove the case from the “heartland” of the 
Guidelines.22  The Supreme Court endorsed the “heartland” concept explicitly in Koon v. 
                                                
16 18 U.S.C. § 3553(c) (1994) (prior to amendment by PROTECT Act). 
17 Id. 
18 See U.S.S.G. §§ 5K.2.10-2.16 (prior to November 2003 manual). 
19 U.S.S.G. § 5H1.1-1.12. 
20 U.S.S.G. § 5H1.4 (policy statement) (stating that physical condition is not ordinarily relevant); U.S.S.G. 
§ 5H1.11 (policy statement) (stating that prior good works are not ordinarily relevant considerations). 
21 See United States v. Tsosie, 14 F.3d 1438, 1441-42 (10th Cir. 1994); United States v. Andruska, 964 F.2d 
640, 644-46 (7th Cir. 1992); United States v. Garlich, 951 F.2d 161, 164 (8th Cir. 1991); United States v. 
Ritchey, 949 F.2d 61,63 (2d Cir. 1991); United States v. Glick, 946 F.2d 335, 338 (4th Cir. 1991); United 
States v. Takai, 941 F.2d 738, 743-44 (9th Cir. 1991); United States v. Russell, 870 F.2d 18, 20 (1st Cir. 
1989). 
22 U.S.S.G. § 5K2.0 (Policy Statement) (as amended Nov. 1, 1994). 
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United States.23  Koon also held that departures from the Guidelines are reviewed for 
abuse of discretion.24   
The Guidelines prohibit the consideration of race, religion, sex, and citizenship 
status in sentencing.25  In 1991, the Commission also decreed that disadvantaged 
upbringing was not a relevant ground for a departure.26   
As a practical matter, prosecutors have substantial influence over downward 
departures.  Informally, they can decline to raise objections when the defendant moves 
for a downward departure at the sentencing hearing, thereby preventing an appeal.  There 
are two more substantive ways in which the government can facilitate downward 
departures.  The first is by itself moving for a downward departure based on the 
offender’s substantial assistance to law enforcement authorities.27  This downward 
departure may be granted only at the government’s request; the judge may not grant such 
a departure on her own.28  Substantial assistance downward departures are by far the most 
common grounds for a sentence outside of the Guidelines.29  Second, the government can 
facilitate downward departures by agreeing to them as part of a plea agreement, though 
the judge need not accept the agreement.  As discussed below, a substantial number of 
downward departures are granted for this reason.30   
                                                
23 518 U.S. 81, 109 (1996) 
24 Id. at 97.   
25 U.S.S.G. § 5H1.10. 
26 U.S.S.G. § 5H1.12. 
27 28 U.S.C. § 994(n). 
28 U.S.S.G. § 5K1.1 (policy statement). 
29 Non-substantial assistance departures occurred in 19.2% of all sentences in my time frame, compared 
with a 12.3% rate for non-substantial assistance departures.  See infra Appendix Table 1. 
30So-called “fast-track” pleas are granted in several districts with heavy caseloads.  Typically, the 
prosecution agrees to recommend a specific reduction in the offense level in exchange for the defendant 
waiving indictment and appeal.  See United States v. Ruiz, 122 S.Ct. 2450, 2453 (2002), for a brief 
description. 
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b. The PROTECT Act and the Feeney Amendment 
As its full name implies, the PROTECT Act began life as an attempt to increase 
penalties for child sex offenders31 and remedy the flaws in Congress’s previous child 
pornography legislation that the Supreme Court struck down in Ashcroft v. Free Speech 
Coalition.32  The PROTECT Act also created the “AMBER Alert” system to aid law 
enforcement in finding abductees.33   
Through the Feeney Amendment, the PROTECT Act grew astonishingly in scope.  
The Amendment restricts judicial discretion in three general ways.  First, it requires 
district courts to specifically state in a written order the grounds for a downward 
departure.34  With respect to certain crimes with child victims, the court must establish 
that the departure fits within one of the explicit enumerated categories for downward 
departures.35  In addition, if a district court is reversed on a downward departure, it may 
not find new grounds for a departure on remand.36  At the appellate level, the 
Amendment mandates de novo review of district court decisions to depart from the 
Guidelines,37 effectively overruling the Supreme Court’s decision in Koon v. United 
States, which had announced an abuse of discretion standard of review.38   
                                                
31 For example, the final version of the PROTECT Act created mandatory life imprisonment for any 
individual convicted twice for sex offenses against a minor.  PROTECT Act, supra note 7, §106.  Penalties 
for kidnapping and sexual abuse were also increased.  Id. at § 101. 
32 535 U.S. 234 (2002).  See also 149 CONG. REC. S236-37 (daily ed. Jan. 13, 2003) (statement of Sen. 
Hatch) (urging action to remedy child pornography laws to comply with the Court’s ruling).  The final 
version of the PROTECT Act prohibited the use of children in the development of virtual child 
pornography.  PROTECT Act, supra note 7, § 502. 
33 PROTECT Act, supra note 7, at § 301.  See also 149 CONG. REC. S5137-01 (daily ed. Apr. 10, 2003) 
(statement of Senator Feinstein). 
34 PROTECT Act, supra note 7, § 401(c).  
35 Id. § 401(a). 
36 Id. § 401(e). 
37 Id. §401(d)(2). 
38 518 U.S. at 97. 
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Finally, the Amendment required the Sentencing Commission to promulgate 
Guidelines amendments that would decrease the number of downward departures.39  
Pursuant to this directive, the Sentencing Commission has forbidden downward 
departures based on acceptance of responsibility unless requested by the prosecution,40 
mitigating role,41 defendant’s decision to plead guilty,42 restitution,43 addiction to 
gambling,44 aberrant behavior when there is a significant criminal history or the crime 
committed was a serious drug trafficking offense,45 and overrepresentation of criminal 
history if the defendant is an “armed career criminal.”46  The Sentencing Commission 
also limited the ability of judges to depart based on family ties,47 victim’s conduct,48 
diminished capacity,49 and totality of the circumstances.50  The Amendment also 
prohibited the Commission from creating new reasons for downward departures or 
loosening Congress’s restrictions for the next two years.51 
Apart from these substantive changes to the law, the Feeney Amendment also 
created a number of reporting requirements.  The chief judge of every district is required 
to collect information on sentencing, including the stated reasons for downward 
departures.52  This information will be made available to Congress or the Justice 
Department when requested.  The Attorney General is required to make a report of every 
                                                
39 PROTECT Act, supra note 7, §401(m)(2)(A). 
40 U.S.S.G. § 5K2.0(d)(2) (2003).   
41 U.S.S.G. § 5K2.0(d)(3) (2003).  As discussed, there is an explicit offense level adjustment for this factor. 
42 U.S.S.G. § 5K2.0(d)(4) (2003).   
43 U.S.S.G. § 5K2.0(d)(5) (2003). 
44 U.S.S.G. § 5H1.4 (2003).   
45 U.S.S.G. § 5K2.20 (2003).   
46 U.S.S.G. § 4A1.3 (2003). 
47 Now family ties are “not ordinarily relevant in determining whether a departure may be warranted.” 
U.S.S.G. § 5H1.6 (2003). 
48 U.S.S.G. § 5K2.10 (2003).   
49 U.S.S.G. § 5K2.13 (2003).   
50 U.S.S.G. § 5K2.0(c) (2003).   
51 PROTECT Act, supra note 7, § 401(j)(2). 
52 Id. § 401(h).   
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departure it opposes to the Judiciary Committees of both houses, including the name of 
the sentencing judge and whether an appeal will be made.53  Attorney General John 
Ashcroft responded to the Act by ordering United States attorneys to appeal any 
departures “not supported by the facts and the law.”54  Also, downward departures that 
meet certain criteria will now be reported to the Justice Department by prosecutors.55  
Chief Justice Rehnquist has publicly expressed his dismay at the reporting requirements, 
worrying that the requirements “could appear to be an unwarranted and ill-considered 
effort to intimidate individual judges in the performance of their judicial duties.”56  At 
least one district court has struck down some of the reporting requirements as 
unconstitutional violations of judicial independence.57 
The policy debate over downward departures has likely grown in importance 
since the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Blakely v. Washington.58  In Blakely, a 
sharply divided Supreme Court struck down portions of Washington State’s sentencing 
guidelines regime, holding that the Sixth Amendment requires a jury to find the facts 
necessary to upwardly adjust the offense level or to make an upward departure.  The 
Supreme Court has now granted certiorari in order to determine whether the very 
similar federal Guidelines structure is also unconstitutional.59   
                                                
53 Id. § 401(l)(2). 
54 Laurie P. Cohen & Gary Fields, Ashcroft Intensifies Campaign Against Soft Sentences by Judges, WALL 
ST. J., Aug. 6, 2003, at A1. 
55 Amendment to § 9-2.170(B) of the U.S. Attorney’s Manual (Effective July 28, 2003) (available at 2003 
WL 22208857, *4) (requiring, for example, that departures based on discouraged factors and departures 
that result in no prison sentence must be reported). 
56 2003 YEAR-END REPORT ON THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY, available at 
http://www.supremecourtus.gov/publicinfo/year-end/2003year-endreport.html.   
57 United States v. Mendoza, No. 03-CR-730-ALL, slip op. at 6 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 12, 2004). 
58 2004 WL 1402697 (June 24). 
59 U.S. v. Booker, __ S.Ct. __, 2004 WL 1713654; United States v. Fanfan, __ S.Ct. __, 2004 WL 1713655. 
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 Blakely does not affect downward departures, and its impact on the federal 
guidelines was uncertain as this article went to press.  It is possible that jury findings 
will become necessary for any adjustments or departures that enhance a sentence, and it 
is even conceivable that the Guidelines will be struck down in their entirety if they are 
not severable.  In any event, Congressional action in response to the Court’s ruling will 
likely be necessary, and Congress may well be tempted to make downward departures 
more difficult if upward departures (or adjustments) must now go to the jury.60   
c. The Feeney Amendment’s Legislative History 
The Feeney Amendment was added to the House version of the PROTECT Act 
without consideration by either Judiciary Committees.61 The subject matter of the 
PROTECT Act made it very hard for those opposed to the Amendment to vote against 
the whole measure.62  As a result, the legislative history of the Feeney Amendment is 
murky.63  Apparently, it had been agreed that the Amendment’s scope would be limited 
to crimes involving children.64  However, a revised version of the Feeney Amendment, 
restricting downward departures for all federal crimes, was introduced in the House-
                                                
60 See Albert W. Alschuler, To Sever or Not to Sever? Why Blakely Requires Action by Congress 
(forthcoming 17 Federal Sentencing Reporter ___ (Oct. 2004)), for a discussion of the severability issues 
and why a Congressional response will be necessary. 
61 This point was raised by some Senators after the PROTECT Act was passed.  149 CONG. REC. S5334 
(daily ed. Apr. 11, 2003) (statement of Mr. Baucus) (lamenting the lack of Senate hearings); 149 CONG. 
REC. S5334 (daily ed. Apr. 11, 2003) (statement of Senator Bingaman) (“At no point in the legislative 
history of this bill was there an opportunity for critical questions to be raised and answered about these new 
sentencing reforms.”)   
62 Senator Edward Kennedy, for example, spoke out strongly against the Feeney Amendment, but 
ultimately voted for the Protect Act.  149 CONG. REC. S5134-01 (daily ed. Apr. 10, 2003) (arguing that the 
actual downward departure rate was quite low and generally criticizing the limitation the Act placed on 
judicial discretion).    
63 In the Senate debate, Senator Kennedy bemoaned the lack of evidence from hearings that would provide 
“justifications for such sweeping changes” and that the legislative history would therefore be “sparse.”  149 
CONG. REC. S5133-34 (daily ed. Apr. 10, 2003); 149 CONG. REC. S5334 (daily ed. Apr. 11, 2003) 
(statement of Senator Bingaman) (“Title IV was added in conference as an amendment with little 
opportunity for the minority to read the amendment.”) 
64 See 149 CONG. REC. S5145-01 (daily ed. Apr. 10, 2003) (statement of Senator Leahy). 
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Senate conference committee at 2 am after the conference committee had been meeting 
for three days.65   
During the floor debate on the Amendment, Senator Orrin Hatch introduced 
evidence provided by the Justice Department that indicated that the rate of downward 
departures had substantially increased in the last few years (in non-immigration cases, 
downward departures had climbed from 9.7% of all sentences in 1996 to 14.7% in 2001, 
an increase of over 50%).66   
Similar testimony was provided before the House Judiciary Committee’s hearings 
on an earlier version of the bill.67  This House hearing was the only committee hearing on 
sentencing reform during the 108th Congress, and is only 56 pages long.68  Nonetheless, 
the bare statistics presented were used by Representative Feeney as follows: 
 
The Department of Justice testified before the Subcommittee on 
Crime, Terrorism and Homeland Security that the rate of downward 
departures on grounds other than substantial assistance to the government 
has climbed steadily every year for many years.  In fact, the rate of such 
departures is up by an overwhelming 50 percent in just the last 5 years 
alone.  And by the way, the rate of departures downwards is 33 times 
higher than the rate the Federal judges depart upwards from the sentencing 
guidelines.69  
 
The supporters of the bill clearly blamed the increase in downward departures on 
an overly lenient federal judiciary.  In addition, the recurring concern about sentencing 
disparities was raised again. Representative Feeney argued that judges were “arbitrarily 
                                                
65 Id. 
66 149 CONG. REC. S5128 (letter of Jamie E. Brown, Acting Assistant Attorney General) (daily ed. Apr. 10, 
2003) 
67 Child Abduction Prevention Act and the Child Obscenity and Pornography Prevention Act of 2003: 
Hearing on H.R. 1104 and H.R. 1161 Before the House of Representatives Subcommittee on Crime, 
Terrorism, and Homeland Security of the Committee on the Judiciary, page 17 Table B. (Mar. 11, 2003) 
(Prepared statement of Daniel P. Collins, Associate Deputy Attorney General, U.S. Justice Department). 
68 See generally id.   
69 149 CONG. REC. H3061-01 (daily ed. Apr. 10, 2003). 
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deviating from the sentencing guidelines…based on their personal biases and prejudices, 
resulting in wide disparity in sentencing.”70  Confirming these sentiments, Representative 
F. James Sensenbrenner recently defended the Feeney Amendment as “a legislative 
response to long-standing Congressional concern that the Sentencing Guidelines were 
increasingly being circumvented by some federal judges through inappropriate downward 
departures, resulting in a return to sentencing disparities.”71   
Taking the Feeney Amendment’s backers at their word, Congress passed the 
Amendment because they believed that downward departures had increased and that 
these increases led to insufficient sentences and unwarranted sentencing disparities.  If 
this were true, the Feeney Amendment may well have substantial benefits.  First, by 
reducing judicial discretion and unwarranted departures, it fortifies the original goals of 
sentencing reform: enhancing fairness in sentencing.  Second, the Feeney Amendment 
may help enforce the punishment levels set by the Sentencing Commission.  While this 
relies on the presumption that the Sentencing Commission set the “right” levels to start 
with, Congress has clearly endorsed the Commission’s approach.   
If sentencing practices have not changed appreciably, then the Amendment 
imposes significant costs.  By reducing judicial discretion further, it prevents judges from 
granting departures in cases in which they are justified.  This would result in more, not 
less, unwarranted sentencing disparity. 
In the analysis below, I take the assumptions of the Feeney Amendment to be 
that: (1) the rate of downward departures has increased; (2) the increase resulted in lighter 
sentences for some and less deterrence (or punishment) overall; and (3) this has caused 
                                                
70 149 CONG. REC. H2423 (daily ed. Mar. 27, 2003). 
71 See Remarks of Representative F. James Sensenbrenner to U.S. Judicial Conference (Mar. 16, 2004), 
reprinted infra 16 FED. SENT. REP.  2__ (2004).   
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unwarranted disparities in sentencing to increase.  As part of the analysis, I also examine 
the changing composition of the district bench over the time frame to determine what 
effect, if any, more Democratic appointees had on the rate of downward departures.   
While partisan differences in sentencing practices are interesting in themselves, they also 
bear on the question of whether or not judges’ preferences (at least as identified by party 
of the appointing president) are behind recent changes in departure rates. 
II  JUDICIAL CHARACTERISTICS AND SENTENCING DISPARITIES  
As mentioned, the Sentencing Guidelines are quite unpopular among federal 
judges.  Given the number of federal judges who have spoken out against the Guidelines, 
anecdotal evidence suggests that they are the most unpopular federal law among the 
judiciary.72  A survey conducted by the Federal Judicial Center in 1997 revealed that 
three-quarters of trial judges and over two-thirds of appellate judges believed that 
mandatory federal guidelines are unnecessary.73  Prior to the Supreme Court’s Decision 
in United States v. Mistretta,74 which upheld the constitutionality of the Sentencing 
Reform Act, over 200 district court judges had ruled that the Act was unconstitutional.75  
                                                
72 See Stith & Cabranes, supra note 2, at 195-97 n.12, for a catalog of federal judges who have written or 
spoken out against the Guidelines prior to 1997.  The Feeney Amendment has also created a very negative 
reaction.  See, e.g., Judge John S. Martin, Let Judges Do Their Jobs, N.Y. TIMES, June 24, 2003 at A31 
(denouncing the Feeney Amendment and resigning from the federal bench because of Congress’s attempt 
to “micromanage the work of the commission”).   
73 Federal Judicial Center, THE UNITED STATES SENTENCING GUIDELINES, RESULTS OF FEDERAL JUDICIAL 
CENTER’S 1996 SURVEY (1997).  A later survey did not repeat this question but indicated that opposition 
might have slackened.  Survey of Article III Judges’ Perspectives on the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 15 
FEDERAL SENTENCING REPORTER 215 (February 2004).  For example, almost half of responding judges 
thought that the “more” of their sentences were achieving the goals of the Guidelines.  Id. at 215. 
74 488 U.S. 351 (1989). 
75 UNITED STATES SENTENCING COMMISSION ANNUAL REPORT 1989, 11.  
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A recent exploration of the retirement decisions of district court judges suggests that 
retirements increased after the introduction of the Sentencing Guidelines.76    
The controversy over the Guidelines among the judiciary is not too surprising.  
The Guidelines greatly restrict judicial discretion, and judges may like to express their 
personal or policy preferences in sentencing.   In addition, the Guidelines make it difficult 
for judges to depart from the specified sentencing ranges.  Trial judges may believe that 
they are forced to impose unfair sentences.   
The claim that judges were declining to enforce the Guidelines, or finding 
creative ways around them, was not an implausible charge.  A large number of studies 
have addressed judicial characteristics and their effect on the outcome of cases.  In 
addition to focusing on the judge’s political preferences (often imputed from the party of 
the appointing president), these studies have variously examined personal attributes of 
judges, such as race, religion, age, and sex as well as educational institution and prior 
experience.77    
 Studies of district court decisions have not found large ideological influences on 
case outcomes.78  For example, Ashenfelter et al. fail to find any significant impact of 
appointing president, sex, religion, or race on the probability that civil rights cases filed 
                                                
76 Richard T. Boylan, Do the Sentencing Guidelines Influence the Retirement Decisions of Federal 
Judges?, 33 J. LEG. STUD. 231 (2004).  In particular, Boylan found that post-Guidelines, judges retired .4 
years after they became eligible for senior status (essentially right away), whereas the previous average had 
been 3 years after eligibility.  Id. at 251.  The differences in pre and post-Guideline retirement decisions are 
quite stark.  Id. at 245 fig. 1. 
77 For a literature survey, see generally Tracey E. George, Court Fixing, 43 ARIZ. L. REV. 9, 9-37 (2001). 
78 To take another example, hundreds of district courts had to rule on the constitutionality of the 
Sentencing Guidelines when they were initially enacted.  One study examined the determinants of the 
decision to uphold or strike down the Guidelines, and did not find that party affiliation made a big 
difference.  Gregory C. Sisk et al., Charting the Influences on the Judicial Mind: An Empirical Study of 
Judicial Reasoning, 73 N.Y.U.L. REV. 1377, 1433 tbl. 4 (1998).  However, factors such as previous 
experience as an academic or public prosecutor were at times significant determinants.  Id. at 1442-43.  
These characteristics are likely correlated with political affiliation, but the authors do not identify a 
political effect separate from them. 
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in district court settle or win.79  There was evidence, however, that judge characteristics 
affected certain procedural events such as discovery or referral to a magistrate, although 
political affiliation again had little explanatory power.80   
 On the other hand, studies at the appellate level have found that a judge’s 
ideology has an impact on case outcomes.  Cross and Tiller demonstrate that panel 
composition affects the outcome and structure of judicial opinions in cases involving 
Chevron deference.81  Another study found that Reagan circuit court appointees are more 
likely to vote for a conservative outcome than Democratic appointees and previous 
Republican appointees.82   
 Studies of specific subject areas have also demonstrated ideological differences.  
Brudney et al. found that Democratic circuit court appointees were much more likely than 
Republican appointees to side with unions.83  Haire et al. found that ideology affects the 
outcome of products liability cases on appeal,84 and Smith and Tiller found that 
Republican appointees are more likely to vote against the Environmental Protection 
Agency than Democratic appointees.85  In sum, the literature has consistently established 
that when judges have discretion, they indulge personal policy preferences to some 
                                                
79 Orley Ashenfelter et al., Politics and the Judiciary: The Influence of Judicial Background on Case 
Outcomes, 24 J. LEGAL STUD. 257 (1995). 
80 Id. at 281. 
81 Frank B. Cross & Emerson H. Tiller, Judicial Partisanship and Obedience to Legal Doctrine: 
Whistleblowing on the Federal Courts of Appeals, 107 YALE L.J. 2155 (1998). 
82 Ronald Stidham et al., The Voting Behavior of President Clinton’s Judicial Appointees, 80 JUDICATURE 
16 (1996). 
83 James J. Brudney et al., Judicial Hostility Toward Labor Unions? Applying the Social Background 
Model to a Celebrated Concern, 60 OHIO ST. L.J. 1675 (1999).  
84 Susan Brodie Haire et al., Attorney Expertise, Litigant Success, and Judicial Decision-making in the U.S. 
Courts of Appeals, 33 L. & SOC'Y REV. 667 (1999). 
85 Joseph Smith & Emerson Tiller, The Strategy of Judging: Evidence from Administrative Law, 31 J. 
LEGAL STUD 61 (2002).  
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extent.  To my knowledge, no study has examined the effect of political party on criminal 
sentencing at the federal level.86  
III THE DATA  
The data I employ to analyze sentencing trends come from two publicly available 
sources.  The sentencing data is made available by the United States Sentencing 
Commission, which collects information on every individual sentenced under the 
Sentencing Guidelines.87   The data on the political composition of district courts comes 
from the Federal Judicial Center biographical data on federal judges.88   
The sentencing data record the offender’s prison sentence in months, whether a 
downward departure was granted, and the reasons for the downward departure (for 
example, whether the downward departure was granted based on substantial assistance or 
pursuant to a plea agreement).  Important offense characteristics are also collected, such 
as the offender’s criminal history, the offense level calculated by the district court, and 
the primary offense of sentencing.  The sentencing data also include a number of 
important offender demographic variables, such as age, race, educational attainment, 
number of dependents, and citizenship.89   
                                                
86 Schanzenbach examines the effect of race, sex, and political composition on racial and sex disparities 
in sentencing, but does not focus on pure political effects.  Racial and Gender Disparities in Sentencing: 
The Effect of District-Level Judicial Demographics, J. LEG. STUD. (forthcoming 2005). 
87 The data are available from the University of Michigan’s Inter-university Consortium for Policy and 
Social Research, http://www.icpsr.umich.edu:8080/ICPSR-STUDY/09317.xml.   
88 History of the Federal Judiciary, available at http://www.fjc.gov (web site of the Federal Judicial Center, 
Washington, DC). 
89 Although these factors are discouraged factors (age, dependents, education) or prohibited factors (race, 
sex, citizenship), numerous studies have found that they remain relevant factors in sentencing even after the 
Guidelines.  See generally DOUGLAS C. MCDONALD & KENNETH E. CARLSON, SENTENCING IN THE 
FEDERAL COURTS: DOES RACE MATTER?, 177 (1993); David B. Mustard, Racial, Ethnic, and Sex 
Disparities in Sentencing: Evidence from the U.S. Federal Courts, 44 J. L. & ECON. 285 (2001); Celesta A. 
Albonetti, Sentencing under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines: Effects of Defendant Characteristics, 
Guilty Pleas, and Departures on Sentence Outcomes for Drug Offenses, 1991-1992, 31 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 
789 (1997).   
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I use sentencing data between 1993 and 2001 (inclusive).90  There are several 
reasons to exclude earlier years.  As mentioned, the Guidelines were upheld by the 
Supreme Court in 1989, and the permissibility of certain downward departures became 
clearer in the early 1990s.  It should be recalled throughout, however, that Congress took 
1996 as its base year of comparison.91  Therefore, special attention is paid to trends from 
this year. 
These years yield a sentenced population of 436,017.  This number is reduced to 
400,438 when I remove life and indeterminent sentences and those for whom the offense 
type or offense level were missing.  It is further reduced when more variables are added 
to some specifications and certain groups (immigration offenders, substantial assistance 
departure recipients) are excluded.92  The tables make note of the changes in the sample 
sizes. 
Appendix Table A1 gives the means and variances of some variables of interest.  
Downward departures occurred in 31.5% of all sentences.   The majority of downward 
departures were granted for substantial assistance (on the motion of the prosecution).  
Upward departures are rare events, occurring in less than 1% of all cases.   
                                                
90The guideline term begins in November, when the sentencing manual and effective amendments are 
released.  I use the Guideline year as my year of reference, so the year 1993 is actually November 1992 to 
November 1993.     
91 Congress likely chose 1996 as the year of comparison because that was the year Koon was decided.  
Recall that Koon decreed that the standard of review for downward departures would be for abuse of 
discretion, overruling the Ninth Circuit’s de novo standard of review.  An earlier analysis of Koon 
suggested that it had no effect on the rate or type of downward departures granted by district courts.  See 
Paul J. Hofer et al., Departure Rates and Reasons After Koon v. United States, 9 FED SENTENCING REP. 
284 tbl. 1 (1997).  The Commission’s report to Congress also found that Koon had no noticeable impact on 
the rate of downward departures.  DOWNWARD DEPARTURES FROM THE FEDERAL SENTENCING GUIDELINES 
(IN RESPONSE TO SECTION 401(M) OF PUBLIC LAW 108-21), United States Sentencing Commission, 54-56 
(2003).  Parsing the effect of Koon is not the point of this essay.  However, the graphical results presented 
below are in line with the conclusion of previous work: there was little or no change in the downward 
departure trends post-Koon.   
92 Mustard noted a similar reduction in the sample size because of missing variables.  Supra note 89, at 298. 
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In some specifications, I control for a number of individual characteristics such as 
age, educational attainment, number of dependents, race, and citizenship status.93  The 
Guidelines prohibit the consideration of the race and citizenship status in sentencing.94  
The Guidelines permit the consideration of the other individual variables, but caution that 
they are “not ordinarily relevant.”95  As can be seen from the Appendix Table A1, the 
sentenced population is disproportionately male, minority, and poorly educated. 
The effect of an increasingly Democratic bench on sentencing is of key interest.  
Ideally, the data would match judges to those who were sentenced.  However, the 
sentencing data do not identify the sentencing judge, and the Sentencing Commission 
will not publicly release the information.  Therefore, I rely on district-level variation.   I 
know in which district an offender was sentenced, and I know the proportion of 
Democrats on that district’s bench.   Given that the average district has only 7.5 judges, 
the addition or subtraction of a single judge can substantially alter the probability an 
offender is sentenced by a Democratic appointee.   Over the 1990s, Democrats moved 
from being less than a quarter of federal district court judges to a slim majority by 2000.  
Obviously, retirements and additions caused greater changes within districts.  Thus, I use 
the political variation within districts over time to measure the impact of Democratic 
appointees on sentencing.  On the assumption that cases are randomly assigned within a 
district, a one-percent increase in Democratic appointees means that the chances of being 
sentenced by a Democratic appointee increased by one-percent. 
                                                
93 I cannot include offender’s income in my estimation strategy, even though it may be relevant to quality 
of legal counsel and other factors that determine sentence length.  The Commission only collected income 
data for three judicial terms.  In addition, the income data, when reported, appears at first glance to be fairly 
inaccurate.  For example, 31.6% of offenders report no income at all (including 8.5% of tax offenders!).  
Offenders have an incentive to avoid reporting income to avoid paying fines and making restitution.   
94 U.S.S.G. § 5H1.10. 
95 U.S.S.G. § 5H1.1-1.12. 
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The data on the proportion of Democrats on the bench of a particular district 
comes from the Federal Judicial Center biographical data on federal judges.96  I use party 
of the appointing president to identify the political composition of the district.   Thus, 
judges appointed during Republican administrations are coded as “Republicans” and 
those appointed during Democratic administrations are coded as “Democrats.”  While 
such coding is not ideal, it is standard in the literature and others have detected partisan 
differences using this methodology.   
IV METHODOLOGY AND RESULTS  
 The Feeney Amendment’s empirical assumptions are directly testable with the 
data at hand.  I will address (1) whether the rate of downward departures increased over 
the past decade; (2) whether this increase, if any, was the result of an increasingly 
Democratic judiciary or was instead driven by secular trends; (3) whether average prison 
sentences changed during this same period; and (4) whether the influence of explicit 
Guidelines factors (offense level and criminal history) on the total prison sentence 
changed.  Before turning to my analysis, I must briefly discuss the United States 
Sentencing Commission’s report to Congress.97   
Section 401(m) of the PROTECT Act ordered the Commission to undertake a 
thorough empirical investigation of downward departures.   In its report, the Commission 
agreed that downward departures had increased recently.  However, by way of a 
straightforward graphical analysis, the Commission’s report suggested that much of the 
                                                
96 History of the Federal Judiciary, available at http://www.fjc.gov (web site of the Federal Judicial Center, 
Washington, DC). 
97 DOWNWARD DEPARTURES FROM THE FEDERAL SENTENCING GUIDELINES (IN RESPONSE TO SECTION 
401(M) OF PUBLIC LAW 108-21), United States Sentencing Commission, (2003), available at 
http://www.ussc.gov/departrpt03/departrpt03.pdf (hereinafter “Commission Report”). 
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increase in downward departures was potentially explainable by the increase in the 
immigration caseload, conditions existing in a few districts, and prosecutorial discretion.   
First, the Commission found that the federal caseload of immigration offenses 
increased greatly during the 1990s, and immigration cases have increasingly been granted 
a high rate of downward departures.98  The reason for this high rate was in part because 
prosecutors in districts with high immigration (and non-citizen) caseloads frequently use 
so-called fast-track departures to help clear their dockets.99  Under the fast track system, 
the defendant waives indictment, trial, and appeal in exchange for a departure.  Indeed, 
the Sentencing Guidelines, at the direction of PROTECT Act,100 now have an explicit 
provision for a four-level fast-track downward departure.101  In addition to fast-track 
departures, departures may also be granted pursuant to deportation, and the vast majority 
of these are in immigration cases.102 
Second, the Commission found that downward departures varied greatly by 
district.103  Indeed, the “border districts” with Mexico (the districts of Southern 
California, Arizona, New Mexico, and West Texas) accounted for the bulk of the increase 
in downward departures, in part because of fast-track departures.104  These are the 
districts most burdened by the increase in the immigration caseloads. 
                                                
98 Id. at 37-40 
99 According to the Sentencing Commission, the Southern District of California accounts for over 92.4% of 
downward departures granted through fast track programs.  Id. at 44.  However, the other border districts of 
Arizona, New Mexico, and Western Texas grant a high number of downward departures pursuant to plea 
agreements that closely resemble a “fast track” system.  Id. at 62-63. 
100 PROTECT Act, supra note 7, § 401(m)(2)(B). 
101 U.S.S.G. § 5K3.1. 
102 See Commission Report, supra note 97, at 44-45. 
103 See Commission Report, supra note 97, at 35-36 figs. 5 & 6.  These figures display trends in twelve 
districts with high and low departure rates.  It is hard to discern any trend in the districts with low departure 
rates.  
104 See id. at 64, fig. 14 and accompanying text. 
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Third, the commission found that in 2001 40% of the non-substantial assistance 
downward departures were attributable to downward departures granted pursuant to a 
plea bargain or were in some other way initiated by the government.105   
Despite these caveats, the Commission concluded that downward departures had 
increased, and that not all of the increase could be explained by differences in district 
caseloads and immigration offenses.106  Indeed, absent the unique circumstances of the 
border districts, the Commission’s report found that downward departures increased from 
a 5.8% rate in 1991 to 10.4% in 2001.107  In addition, it is far from clear that downward 
departures pursuant to a plea bargain should be excluded from consideration as  
government-induced departures.  Plea bargaining occurs in the shadow of the judge, and 
the reputation of a particular district or judge should influence the outcome.108 
a.  Downward Departures 
The first step in the analysis is to examine whether there was a secular trend in 
downward departures over the last decade.  In my analysis of downward departures, I 
exclude cases in which a substantial assistance downward departure was granted and all 
cases in which a downward departure was impossible because no prison time was an 
option (these are cases in the “A” range of the sentencing table).   This limits the sample 
to the population of those sentenced who were “at risk” for a non-substantial assistance 
downward departure.109 
                                                
105 Id. at 20.   
106 Id. at v. 
107 Id. 
108 For a discussion, see generally Lacasse & Payne, supra note 11. 
109 Substantial assistance departures and regular departures are essentially mutually exclusive as the 
defendant would typically waive a motion for a regular downward departure in order to receive a 
substantial assistance departure.  The Sentencing Commission’s data treats them as mutually exclusive. 
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I then estimate a linear probability model in which the dependent variable takes 
on the value 1 if a downward departure was granted in an individual case and 0 
otherwise.   The key variables of interest are the year dummies.  In the tables below and 
in the appendix, the excluded year is always 1993.  Thus, the year effects measure the 
change in departures relative to 1993. 
In the terms of equations, the Models take on the following forms:   
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where i indexes individual offenders, j indexes district, and t indexes judicial term.  The 
primary coefficients of interest are the λ, which are the year effects.  Model 1 gives the 
“raw” rate of downward departures by year, not controlling for potentially relevant 
variables such as type of offense and position on the sentencing table.  Thus, the year 
dummy coefficients in Model 1 are simply changes relative to the 1993 departure rate.  
Model 2 controls for offense characteristics and district.  Offense characteristics are 
position on the sentencing table (offense level/criminal history) and offense type.  
Sentencing table position was controlled for by dummy variables for each offense level, a 
dummy variable for each criminal history category, and an interaction term between 
offense level and criminal history category.  Offense type was entered as dummy 
variables for each of the 41 offense categories identified in the Commission’s dataset.  In 
addition, the statutory minimum sentence, which may trump the Guidelines, was included 
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as an offense characteristic control.110  Districtj equals one if an offender was sentenced 
in district j.   
Model 3 includes all dependent variables from Model 2 in addition to individual 
offender characteristics.  Offender characteristics are sex, race, age, education, and 
number of dependents. Race is entered as a dummy for black, Hispanic, Asian, and other, 
with white being the excluded category.  To control for age of the defendant, I include 
age and squared age as dependent variables.  Educational attainment is entered as 
dummies for high school completion, college completion, and graduate degree, with less 
than high school being the excluded category.   Number of dependents is entered as 
dummies for zero, one, and two dependents, with three or more being the excluded 
category.   I also include the method of disposition of the case in Model 3 (whether by 
jury or bench trial, with plea bargain as the excluded category). 
Later specifications add Proportion Democratjt as a dependent variable to these 
models.  This is the proportion of the judges that are Democrats in district j in year t.  
Thus, Proportion Democratjt varies across districts and years.  In regressions which 
include this variable, the standard errors are Huber-White robust and reflect clustering by 
district. 
The easiest way to judge the trends reported here is to examine them in graphical 
form.  Thus, the tables presented below trace the downward departure rate since 1993.  
The underlying estimates for the graphical presentations are reported in the Appendix 
Tables A2 through A5.  The year effects for all downward departure regressions were 
almost always positive and significant at the 1% level or less (and even more strongly 
                                                
110 For a discussion of how mandatory minimum sentences can influence sentencing practices, see Frank 
O. Bowman, III & Michael Hiese, Quiet Rebellion II: An Empirical Analysis of Declining Federal Drug 
Sentences Including Data from the District Level, 87 Iowa L. Rev. 477, 487-491 (2002).    
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jointly significant) indicating that downward departures became more common after 
1993.  In addition, the year effects typically increased as the years go by, indicating a 
strong upward trend in the rate of downward departures.   
Figure 1 presents the rates of non-substantial assistance downward departures in 
graphical form: 
 
 
As is readily apparent, downward departures increased over the last decade 
under all model specifications.  However, when we control for district, offense type, 
offense level, and criminal history in Model 2, the increase is much less pronounced.  
Adding individual demographic characteristics causes the upward trend to attenuate a 
bit more.  Figure 2 below excludes immigration offenses and reaches much the same 
conclusion: 
Figure 1:  Downward Departures (Non-Substantial Assistance)
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Likewise, some may argue that downward departures pursuant to a plea 
agreement should not be included in the analysis.  Figure 3 excludes these  departures: 
 
  
Figure 2: Downward Departures:  No Immigration Offenses
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Figure 3: Downward Departures, No Plea Bargains
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Figure 4 likewise excludes the border districts: 
 
 
 
In sum, downward departures became more common over the last decade.  This 
result holds whether we exclude immigration offenses, plea bargains, or border districts.  
In each case, however, the trend attenuates significantly in Model 2 when I include 
controls for the nature of the offense and district of sentencing.  Also in each case, there 
is further slight attenuation when offender characteristics are added.  Thus, while there 
was a general trend toward a higher rate of downward departures, a substantial portion of 
the trend is readily explainable.   
Most importantly, the addition of offender demographic variables (and method of 
disposition) does not greatly alter the trends in downward departures.  This suggests that 
offender demographic characteristics, which the Guidelines discourage or forbid from 
consideration, explain very little of the trend toward higher departures.  This should be 
Figure 4: Downward Departures, No Border Districts
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comforting to those concerned about illegitimate or discouraged considerations leading to 
higher departure rates. 
If we use 1996 as our basis of comparison, as Congress did, there was no dramatic 
trend toward higher downward departure rates conditional on offense and district.  
Indeed, in the non-immigration sample, conditioning on offense and district effects, the 
rate of downward departures increased from 12.65% to 15.75% between 1996 and 2001.  
When we exclude border districts, Models 2 and 3 suggest that there was no trend from 
1997 onward.   
My results are very much in line with what the Commission suggested in a less 
formal way in its report to Congress.  There is no doubt that downward departures 
increased, but they did not do so to the extent suggested by proponents of the Feeney 
Amendment if one is willing to consider offense characteristics and district effects.   
Of course, true believers in the Guidelines and their goal of eliminating 
unwarranted sentencing disparities may argue that some of the variables for which I 
control should not affect the rate of downward departures.  Indeed, an objection can 
potentially be raised for each control I have chosen.  For example, if judges are more 
lenient on certain crimes or certain types of defendants than others, a higher departure 
rate for those crimes or offenders may reflect an unwarranted disparity.  Likewise, if the 
Guidelines were intended to reduce sentencing disparities between districts, it is 
inappropriate to include district dummies.   Doing so removes variation that those who 
supported the Guidelines were concerned with.  In addition, certain individual variables, 
such as age and the number of dependents are not ordinarily relevant considerations in 
granting a downward departure by the terms of the Guidelines themselves.  Some factors 
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I controlled for, such as race and citizenship, are prohibited factors.  If the Guidelines 
were intended to reduce disparities among individuals who committed similar crimes, 
these controls are inappropriate.   
On the other hand, legitimate considerations could also be correlated with district, 
offense, and offender characteristics.  For example, some districts are strapped for 
resources because of heavy caseloads and this may increase the rate of downward 
departures.  While the Guidelines attempt to impose uniformity nationwide, conditions 
vary from district to district, including the pressures on district courts and prosecutors due 
to the size of their dockets.    Indeed, as mentioned, the Feeney Amendment recognized 
this fact and even codified “fast-track” departures.  It is also possible that the drug 
offenders are different from, say, fraud offenders, and relative changes in number of such 
offenses should be controlled for, if extenuating circumstances (unobservable to the 
econometrician) are more common in one type of case than another.111  Offense levels 
themselves may be a legitimate influence on the likelihood of a downward departure.  On 
the one hand, offense levels are intended to capture the underlying harm of the crime.  
However, higher offense levels imply higher recommended sentences, and extenuating 
circumstances become more relevant for higher offense levels—a departure of two or 
three offense levels makes little difference for low offense levels (just a few months 
prison), but matter more for higher offense levels (perhaps a few years). Even race and 
citizenship, which are prohibited from consideration, may in part be proxies for wealth 
and, by extension, quality of legal counsel and sophistication.   
                                                
111 For example, drug offenders who may have been involved in petty crimes may have their criminal 
record overstated and deserve a departure for that reason, whereas fraud offenders are less likely to have 
such issues 
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On balance, however, true believers in the Guidelines could still make a plausible 
case that departures substantially increased, and this increase resulted in unwarranted 
sentencing disparities.  Thus, I must further refine the analysis. 
b.  Downward Departures and Political Affiliation 
 I now add the percentage of the Democratic appointees on the district bench as a 
control variable for downward departures.  I take the same approach as before.  The first 
linear probability regression includes only year dummies and the Proportion Democrat 
variable.  The second regression controls for position on the sentencing table, offense 
type, and district.  The third and fourth regressions include additional controls for 
individual offender characteristics, alternately excluding and including district dummies.   
There may be a concern that Democrats are not randomly assigned to districts.  
For example, if Democrats are more likely to be assigned to high-crime districts, they 
may appear to grant a large number of downward departures.  The cause of the 
departures, however, would not be lenient Democrats, but overtaxed prosecutors granting 
plea bargains.  To alleviate this concern in part, the regressions include district dummies.  
This creates district fixed effects, which means that average district effects are removed 
from the analysis.  Thus, when district fixed effects are included, the variation in 
Proportion Democrat comes from changes in the political composition within a district.  
Therefore, as long as retirements and replacements are random, there is little concern 
about non-random assignment when district dummies are included.  Excluding district 
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dummies (Regression 3) permits between-district variation to identify the Proportion 
Democrat coefficient.112   
Table 1: Non-Substantial Assistance Downward Departures 
 
 Regression 1 Regression 2 Regression 3 Regression 4 
1994   .017** 
 (.0042) 
.015** 
 (.0041) 
.013** 
 (.0046) 
.012** 
 (.0043) 
1995 .021* 
 (.0091) 
.016* 
 (.0080) 
.012 
 (.0081) 
.0082 
 (.0080) 
1996 .042** 
 (.0013) 
.030** 
 (.0087) 
.025** 
 (.0010) 
.022** 
 (.0013) 
1997 .069** 
 (.0021) 
.041** 
 (.012) 
.044** 
 (.0014) 
.039** 
 (.0021) 
1998 .081** 
 (.0030) 
.044** 
 (.015) 
.042** 
 (.0017) 
.037** 
 (.0030) 
1999 .093** 
 (.0030) 
.051** 
 (.010) 
.046** 
 (.019) 
.039* 
 (.014) 
2000 .095** 
 (.0034) 
.053** 
 (.010) 
.041** 
 (.015) 
.037** 
 (.0089) 
2001 .103** 
 (.0034) 
.065** 
 (.013) 
.051** 
 (.017) 
.048** 
 (.0099) 
Prop. Democrats on 
District Bench 
.094 
(.092) 
.059 
(.078) 
.071 
(.069) 
.079 
(.088) 
Constant .079** 
(.0279) 
-.35** 
(.037) 
.14** 
(.062) 
-.18** 
(.038) 
Joint test 
years/Prop. Dem 
sig<.0001 sig<.0001 sig<.0001 sig<.0001 
District Dummies No Yes No Yes 
Offense Type 
Dummies 
No Yes Yes Yes 
Sentencing Table 
Dummies 
No Yes Yes Yes 
Offender 
Demographics  
No No Yes Yes 
R-squared .0148 .1980 .0784 .1987 
Sample Size 282,099 281,832 261,736 261,736 
All substantial assistance departures and sentences in the A range of the sentencing table have been removed from 
the data.  Sentencing table dummies are entered as a dummy variable for each offense level, a dummy variable for 
each criminal history category, and an interaction term between offense level and criminal history category.  
Offender demographic variables are dummies for race (black, Hispanic, Asian, other); citizenship status; education 
dummies (high school, college, graduate school); dummies for number of dependents (zero, one, two); age 
(entered as a quadratic). In Models 2-4, includes statutory minimum sentence, if any.  In models 3 and 4, 
disposition mechanism (jury, bench trial) are also included.  (OLS coefficients, Huber-White robust standard errors 
adjusted for clustering by district in parenthesis.)  The sample sizes are slightly smaller than in corresponding 
appendix tables due to the exclusion of territorial districts (Guam, U.S. Virgin Islands, Marianas).  **coefficient 
significant at less than 1% level, *coefficient significant at 5% level or less.   
 
  
The interpretation of the Proportion Democrat coefficient is the increase in the 
rate of downward departures that would result from an entirely Democratic bench.  The 
sample size is quite large and there was substantial variation in the political makeup of 
                                                
112 This is a potentially important robustness check because the initial liberal/conservative make up of the 
district may affect sentencing practices in a path-dependent manner (perhaps by affecting district culture 
or local rules). 
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district courts over the sample time frame.  If the changing political composition of the 
bench had an effect on sentencing, any sizeable impact should be detected.  The 
Proportion Democrat coefficient is positive and large relative to the year effects, but is 
not statistically significant in any model.  At first blush, this indicates that adding more 
Democratic judges to the bench did not affect the rate of downward departures.   
However, just because a coefficient is insignificant does not mean it has no effect.  
The effect could be too small to measure or random error could cause no effect to be 
observed.  There were clearly two trends during this period: a trend toward higher rates of 
downward departure and a trend toward more Democrats on the bench.  The two are 
obviously highly correlated: more Democrats were coming on the bench just as 
downward departure rates were beginning to rise.  It is possible that the data do no permit 
us to adequately distinguish between them.  I therefore cannot reject the hypothesis that 
Democratic districts were marginally more likely to grant downward departures.  Given 
the large sample size here, there is good reason to believe that any strong effect should 
have been detected.  In addition, the year effects remain large and statistically significant, 
signifying that there was a strong trend toward more departures that was not attributable 
to changes in the political composition of the bench. 
In sum, we can safely conclude that the increasing number of Democrats on the 
bench is not important in explaining downward departure rates.  The year effects remain 
strongly significant after we add controls for political composition.  This implies that 
offenders in both relatively Democratic and relatively Republican districts were 
increasingly likely to receive downward departures.  
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It is possible that Democrats and Republicans have different sentencing 
preferences across crime categories.  For example, a willingness among Democrats to 
depart more for drug offenses but less for white collar crimes could mask political effects.  
To test this, in Table 2 I divide crimes up into eight broad categories and interact each 
one with the Proportion Democrat variable.  Strong trends were evident in the case of 
immigration offenses (for the reasons discussed above), so I remove them from the 
analysis here. 
Table 2: Non-Substantial Assistance Downward Departures by Crime Category 
 
 Regression 1 Regression 2 Regression 3 Regression 4 
Violent*Dem .017 
 (.034) 
.018 
 (.050) 
.016 
 (.034) 
.017 
 (.034) 
Drug*Dem .20 
 (.21) 
.10 
 (.11) 
.15 
 (.12) 
.20 
 (.21) 
Theft*Dem .036 
 (.034) 
.0097 
 (.057) 
.038 
 (.031) 
.036 
 (.034) 
White Collar*Dem .037 
 (.038) 
.0058 
 (.049) 
.031 
 (.034) 
.037 
 (.038) 
Environmental*Dem .12 
 (.081) 
.12 
 (.090) 
.10 
 (.084) 
.12 
 (.081) 
Pornography*Dem .13 
 (.075) 
.088 
 (.082) 
.13 
 (.075) 
.13 
 (.075) 
Racketeering*Dem -.005 
 (.045) 
-.032 
 (.069) 
-.004 
 (.043) 
-.005 
 (.045) 
Obstruction *Dem .013 
 (.069) 
.028 
 (.050) 
.005 
 (.063) 
.013 
 (.069) 
Constant .092** 
(.012) 
.11** 
(.031) 
.24** 
(.069) 
.092** 
(.012) 
Joint Test .5262 .3770 .4769 .2398 
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
District Dummies No Yes No Yes 
Offense Type 
Dummies 
No Yes Yes Yes 
Sentencing Table 
Dummies 
No Yes Yes Yes 
Offender 
Demographics  
No No Yes Yes 
R-squared .0164 .1720 .0553 .1804 
Sample Size 240,086 240,015 229,563 229,563 
All substantial assistance departures, immigration offenses, and sentences in the A range of the sentencing table 
have been removed from the data.  Sentencing table dummies are entered as a dummy variable for each offense 
level, a dummy variable for each criminal history category, and an interaction term between offense level and 
criminal history category.  Dummies for theft offenses through obstruction of justice offenses are included but not 
reported (violent offenses are the excluded category).  Violent=murder, manslaughter, sexual abuse, assault, armed 
robbery; Theft=auto, burglary; Drug=all drug offenses; Racketeering=racketeering and gambling offenses; White 
Collar=tax, embezzlement, fraud, antitrust; Pornography=obscenity/child pornography offenses; 
Obstruction=obstruction of justice offenses; Environmental=environmental offenses [main effects included by not 
reported].  Offender demographic variables are dummies for race (black, Hispanic, Asian, other); citizenship 
status; education dummies (high school, college, graduate school); dummies for number of dependents (zero, one, 
two); age (entered as a quadratic). In Models 2-4, statutory minimum sentence, if any, are included.  In models 3 
and 4, disposition mechanism (jury, bench trial) are also included.  (OLS coefficients, Huber-White robust 
standard errors adjusted for clustering by district in parenthesis.)  Immigration offenses have been excluded, and I 
also excluded a number of small crime categories: traffic offenses, national defense offenses, civil rights offenses, 
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and miscellaneous offenses.  **coefficient significant at less than 1% level, *coefficient significant at 5% level or 
less.   
  
Surprisingly, no partisan differences are detected in the rate of downward 
departures among separate crime categories, either individually or jointly. 
c.  Total Prison Sentences 
I now extend the analysis to total prison sentence (in months).113  The data are 
presented in the same manner as that for downward departures.  First, I present graphical 
trends for raw average prison sentences, prison sentences controlling for offense type, 
district, and position on the sentencing table, and then prison sentences controlling for 
offense type, district, sentencing table position, and individual offender demographics.  
The graphical trends are presented in Figure 5: 
                                                
113 Life imprisonment is possible in certain Guideline ranges, and it is not clear how to calculate the 
prison sentence level in months for a life sentence.  I have therefore excluded life sentences from the 
analysis.  I also exclude a few hundred sentences recorded as 990 months or greater.  These outliers 
seemed to affect estimated trends a bit, but likely contain little information about the changing nature of 
prison sentences. 
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Raw average prison sentences in Model 1 clearly decrease over time.  As can be 
seen, however, there is little change in prison sentences over time when one controls for 
more variables in Models 2 and 3.  While prison sentences for several years in Model 2 
are statistically significantly lower than sentences in 1993 (see Table A-6 in the 
Appendix), the largest difference is 1.62 months.  Given a 48-month average sentence, 
this represents a decrease of roughly three percent.  The change is even smaller when I 
include the full set of demographic variables in the regression in Model 3.  Indeed, in 
Model 3 prison sentences in 2001 are not significantly different from sentences in 
1993.114 
                                                
114 Bowman & Hiese, supra note 113, find that drug sentences declined over the 1990s, but much of the 
decline was specific to certain districts and circuits.  See also Frank O. Bowman & Michael Heise, Quiet 
Rebellion? Explaining Nearly a Decade of Declining Federal Drug Sentences, 86 IOWA L. REV. 1043 
(2001).  My approach differs somewhat from Bowman & Heise, who were interested also in explaining 
how prosecutorial discretion, minimum sentences, safety valve amendments, changes in criminal history 
Figure 5: Change in Average Prison Sentences 
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I now turn to whether or not the changing federal bench affected prison sentences.  
Table 3 presents the analysis with the Proportion Democrat variable as a control.115 
Table 3: Total Prison Time in Months  
 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
1994   -.14 
(1.09) 
-.21 
(.56) 
-.55 
(.51) 
-.49 
(.51) 
1995 1.21 
(1.73) 
-.61 
(.76) 
-.87 
(.64) 
-.81 
(.64) 
1996 1.58 
(1.82) 
-.73 
(.85) 
-1.41* 
(.67) 
-1.32 
(.79) 
1997 -1.26 
(2.62) 
.033 
(.90) 
-.53 
(.55) 
-.40 
(.75) 
1998 1.73 
(2.73) 
-.16 
(.83) 
-.91 
(.82) 
-.72 
(.65) 
1999 2.83 
(2.91) 
-1.15 
(.67) 
-1.85* 
(.83) 
-1.61 
(.85) 
2000 2.83 
(3.11) 
-.46 
(1.01) 
-1.27 
(1.03) 
-1.02 
(.85) 
2001 3.62 
(3.44) 
-.61 
(.73) 
-.84 
(.81) 
-.71 
(.81) 
Prop. Demo 
District 
Bench 
-11.99 
(8.46) 
 -2.41 
(2.14) 
2.77 
(3.11) 
.72 
(2.66) 
Constant 40.61** 
(3.22) 
-15.11 
 (16.13) 
2.52 
(13.27) 
2.92 
(15.27) 
Joint test of  
year &  
Prop. Dem.  
(p-value) 
.0097 .0905 .0542 .0576 
Sample All Cases All Cases All Cases All Cases 
District Dummies No Yes No Yes 
Offense Type  
Dummies 
No Yes Yes Yes 
Sentencing Table  
Dummies 
No Yes Yes Yes 
Offender  
Demographic Varia
No No Yes Yes 
Sample Size 396,600 396,600  369,324  369,324 
Sentencing table dummies are entered as a dummy variable for each offense level, a dummy variable 
for each criminal history category, and an interaction term between offense level and criminal history 
category.  Offender demographic variables are dummies for race (black, Hispanic, Asian, other);  
citizenship status; education dummies (high school, college, graduate school); dummies for number of 
dependents (zero, one, two); age (entered as a quadratic).  In Models 2-4, statutory minimum sentence, 
if any, are included.  In Models 3 and 4, disposition mechanism (jury, bench trial) are included.  The 
sample sizes are slightly smaller than in previous tables due to the exclusion of life sentences and  
territorial districts (Guam, U.S. Virgin Islands, Marianas).  (Tobit coefficients, Huber-White robust 
standard errors adjusted for clustering by district when Prop. Dem. variable used.)  **coefficient 
significant at less than 1% level, *coefficient significant at 5% level or less.   
 
                                                                                                                                            
and so forth may have affected drug sentences.  My specification removes many of these factors by 
including them in the regressions because they are not indicators of judicial discretion, although they 
have important impacts on overall sentences. 
115 Because including the Proportion Democrat variable changed the coefficient estimates for the year 
effects so little, I do not include a total prison regression table without the Proportion Democrat in the 
appendix. 
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Again, as in the case of downward departures, the political composition of the 
district of sentencing has no measurable impact on the total prison sentence. 
How could downward departures increase, whatever the cause, but total 
punishment levels remain relatively unaffected?  The answer is that the prison time 
imposed in departure cases increased during the period examined.  Thus, while departures 
increased, they were simply smaller in magnitude.  Figure 6 clearly demonstrates this 
result.116   
 
 
 
 
 Not every individual year effect is significant (see Table A7), but beginning in 
1996 the year effects become positive.  In addition, the year effects are strongly jointly 
significant (p-value of less than .01).  In other words, taken together, the year effects 
                                                
116 Any prison sentence that was recorded as a downward departure but was nonetheless in the original 
guideline range was excluded from the sample.     
Figure 6:  Change in Total Prison Sentence (Departures)
-5
-4
-3
-2
-1
0
1
2
3
4
5
1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
Year
C
ha
ng
e 
in
 M
on
th
s 
of
 P
ris
on
 
Model 1: Change in average [1993=49 
months] 
Model 2:  Offense level, criminal history, and 
effects removed 
Model 3:  Offense level, criminal history, 
district, and demographic effects removed 
Hosted by The Berkeley Electronic Press
 39
suggest a strong trend toward longer prison sentences in departure cases over the time.   
While I do not report the results, I again did not find any evidence of a political 
composition effect when the sample was limited solely to departure cases.   
 As a final check on the prison sentence analysis, I examine the possibility that 
judges may mask their sentencing preferences to some extent in the calculation of the 
offense level.  Recall that the base offense level is set by the crime of conviction.  For 
example, fraud has a base offense level of 6.  The judge may adjust this level to reflect 
special offense characteristics or other elements of the crime.  For example, he may 
adjust the offense level for the role played by the offender.  An aggravating role may lead 
to a 2 to 4 level enhancement while a mitigating role may lead to a 2 to 4 level 
decrease.117  It is important to note that these are adjustments, which the Guidelines 
encourage, not departures which require unusual circumstances. Because they are 
primarily factual findings, they are typically reviewed for clear error. 
To make certain that trends in prison sentences are not masked by changes in 
offense levels, I rerun the previous analysis taking final offense level as the dependent 
variable.  To control for initial position on the sentencing table, I include right hand side 
controls for base offense level, which is set by the crime of conviction. 
The results in Table 4 suggest that offense levels have, if anything, increased 
slightly over the time and Democratic appointees do not calculate different offense levels 
in general.118 
                                                
117 §§3B1.1-2.  Bowman & Hiese, supra note 112, find that drug offenses were more likely to receive 
mitigating role adjustments over time and less likely to receive aggravating role adjustments.  Id. at 509. 
118 Once the analysis was further refined, it appeared that Democratic appointees calculated lower offense 
levels for drug and violent crimes and higher offense levels for white collar and environmental offenses.  
This paper is primarily concerned with general trends in sentencing.  In addition, the Feeney Amendment 
did not alter the way that judges could calculate offense levels.  I therefore do not make a further analysis 
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Table 4: Final Offense Level Regressions 
 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
1994   .15** 
(.030) 
.17** 
(.027) 
.16** 
(.053) 
.18** 
(.042) 
1995 .12** 
(.031) 
.19** 
(.028) 
.14 
(.078) 
.23** 
(.057) 
1996 .016 
(.030) 
.067* 
(.027) 
.027 
(.090) 
.099 
(.069) 
1997 .003 
(.029) 
.084** 
(.027) 
.018 
(.095) 
.12 
(.076) 
1998 .001 
(.021) 
.062* 
(.023) 
.021 
(.11) 
.11 
(.087) 
1999 .15** 
(.028) 
.29** 
(.026) 
.18 
(.10) 
.35** 
(.073) 
2000 .20** 
(.028) 
.40** 
(.025) 
.22* 
(.095) 
.47** 
(.071) 
2001 .15** 
(.027) 
.43** 
(.025) 
.18 
(.10) 
.51** 
(.072) 
Prop. Democrats 
on District Bench 
  -.11 
(.34) 
-.28 
(.23) 
Constant 18.29** 
(.82) 
17.15** 
(.91) 
18.57** 
(.66) 
17.15** 
(2.71) 
Joint test of year &  
Prop. Dem. (p-value) 
sig<.0001 sig<.0001 .0008 sig<.0001 
R-Square .8001 .8434 .8002 .8431 
District Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Offense Type Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Sentencing Table 
Dummies (base level) 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Offender Demographic  
Variables 
No Yes No Yes 
Sample Size 399,997 373,001 399,997 373,001 
Sentencing table dummies are entered as a dummy variable for each base offense level, a dummy 
variable for each criminal history category, and an interaction term between base offense level and 
criminal history category.  Offender demographic variables are dummies for race (black, Hispanic, 
Asian, other);  citizenship status; education dummies (high school, college, graduate school); dummies 
for number of dependents (zero, one, two); age (entered as a quadratic).  In Models 3 and 4, statutory 
minimum sentence, if any, and disposition mechanism (jury, bench trial) are also included.  The sample 
sizes in Models 3 and 4 are slightly smaller than in Models 1 and 2 due to the exclusion of territorial 
districts (Guam, U.S. Virgin Islands, Marianas).  (OLS coefficients, Huber-White robust standard errors 
adjusted for clustering by district in parenthesis in Models 3 and 4.)  **coefficient significant at less 
than 1% level, *coefficient significant at 5% level or less.   
 
  d.  Disparity 
 It is not entirely clear how best to measure disparities in prison sentences.  A 
reasonable measure, however, is the adjusted R-square of a prison sentence regression.  
The R-square is the percentage of variation in the dependent variable explained by 
variation in the independent variables.  The goal of the Guidelines is real offense 
sentencing, which implies that, for most cases, only offense level and criminal history 
                                                                                                                                            
here, but leave open the possibility that judges can to some extent mask sentencing preferences in the 
calculation of the offense level for future work.   
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should affect the prison sentence.  If sentencing disparities have increased, the percentage 
variation in prison sentences explained by the explicit Guideline factors of offense level 
and criminal history should have decreased.  Thus, I split the sample up by year and 
consider the adjusted R-square of prison sentences explained solely by position on the 
sentencing table in each year and the presence of a statutory minimum sentence.  As a 
next step, I add the full controls that were included in the regressions above: demographic 
variables, district dummies, and offense type dummies.  This would help, for example, 
capture changes in immigration and drug trafficking caseloads and help us to see what 
additional information is provided by potentially irrelevant demographic factors.119   
As can be seen in Figure 7 the percentage of prison time explained by explicit 
guidelines factors has not changed greatly over the last nine years.  In addition, the 
additional amount explained by potentially irrelevant demographic factors or district 
characteristics has, if anything, decreased slightly. 
 
                                                
119 As a final check, I excluded those sentences in zones A and B of the sentencing table, because prison 
time in these ranges may be entirely replaced by alternative sentences under U.S.S.G. § 5C1.1, and again 
the R-Square remained remarkably consistent year to year.  For a report of those results, see Max 
Schanzenbach, Have Sentencing Practices Really Changed?  An Analysis of the Feeney Amendment’s 
Real Concerns, 16 FED. SENT. REP. 257 (2004).   
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  There is simply no evidence that prison sentences have become more detached from the 
Guidelines.  The percentage variation in prison sentences explained by explicit Guidelines 
factors (including minimum sentences) varies between 72% and 75% from 1993 to 2001, with no 
evident time trend.  The top graph traces the percentage variation in prison sentences explained 
by the Guidelines factors, offense category, district of sentencing, and demographic controls.  
This graph also suggests a fairly stable R-square, and it also demonstrates that district, offense 
category, and demographic controls add little to the explanation of prison sentences in general, 
and their contribution may have decreased slightly in later years.   
In sum, the percentage of the total prison sentence explained by offense level and 
criminal history has remained surprisingly consistent in spite of the trend toward more downward 
departures from both judges and prosecutors.  There is no evidence that an increase in downward 
departures increased unwarranted sentencing disparities, and there is no evidence that the 
guidelines have become less important in federal criminal sentencing.   
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Figure 7: Percentage Prison Time Explained by Guidelines Factors 
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IV CONCLUSION  
The empirical arguments offered by supporters of the Feeney Amendment were 
deeply flawed.  While departure rates increased recently, much of this increase is 
attributable to changes in the composition of the federal criminal caseload.   In addition, 
average prison sentences did not change greatly.  We can draw three conclusions from the 
prison sentence analysis: (1) prison sentences controlling for offense and offender 
characteristics are little changed since 1993 (they at most decreased by about 3%); (2) 
even though the number of downward departures increased, longer sentences were 
handed out in departure cases, resulting in little overall change in prison sentences, and; 
(3) the influence of the Guidelines on total prison sentence has remained fairly constant, 
which is not surprising given the first two results.   The prison analysis is further 
supported by the fact that there was no evidence that judges were calculating lower 
offense levels over this time period.   If anything, final offense levels increased slightly. 
Most intriguingly, I am unable to find any correlation between the proportion of 
Democratic appointees on a district bench and the likelihood of a downward departure, 
the length of prison sentence, or the final offense level.  I decline to make a firm 
declaration that there are no partisan differences in sentencing, as I have not examined 
differences between crime categories in detail.  I can firmly conclude, however, that the 
changing political composition of the federal bench had little or no influence on 
sentencing in general and was not primarily responsible for sentencing trends.  I leave 
open the possibility that a more refined analysis may detect partisan preferences, 
especially between particular crime categories. 
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Overall, my results suggest that the Guidelines are working largely as intended.  
Better data may well make these results clearer and actually help the judiciary defend 
itself from more restrictions by Congress.  In this light, striking down the reporting 
requirements of the Feeney Amendment, as at least one district court has,120 would be a 
grave strategic error on the part of the judiciary.  The alternative to the reporting 
requirements may be more regulation from Congress, especially if the Feeney 
Amendment fails to reduce the rates of downward departures.  In addition, more 
regulation of downward departures is likely if enhancements to sentences become more 
difficult under Blakely.  Indeed, an earlier version of the Feeney Amendment was much 
harsher than its final draft.121  Congress may well be compelled to take up reform again.  
It would be better for Congress and the Justice Department to have access to sentencing 
data that may allow targeted appeals and reforms.  The alternative may ultimately be a 
broader restriction of judicial discretion based on a poorly informed empirical record.122 
                                                
120 United States v. Mendoza, No. 03-CR-730-ALL, slip op. at 6 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 12, 2004). 
121 The original amendment would have eliminated downward departures for, inter alia,  family ties, 
aberrant behavior, educational skills, or an overstated criminal record.  Amendment to S. 151 (formerly 
H.R.1104) offered by Mr. Feeney of Florida, 108th Cong., 1st Session (Mar. 27, 2003). 
122 Much along these same lines, Stephanos Bibas has argued as follows: 
 
Searching appellate review is a measured way of keeping wayward judges in line, but the 
elimination of departures altogether will constrain good judges more than bad.  Judges 
who conscientiously follow the law will have even less discretion after Feeney, but these 
are the judges who least need to be reined in.  Judges who [distort or ignore] the law 
probably distort the facts to get around the Feeney Amendment. 
 
The Feeney Amendment and the Continuing Rise of Prosecutorial Power to Plea Bargain, 94 J. 
Crim. L. & Criminology 295, 308 (2003). 
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APPENDIX 
Figure A1:  United States Sentencing Guidelines 
 
  Criminal History Category (Criminal History Points) 
 Offense 
Level 
I 
(0 or 1) 
II 
(2 or 3) 
III 
(4, 5, 6) 
IV 
(7, 8, 9) 
V 
(10, 11, 12) 
VI 
(13 or more) 
 1 0-6 0-6 0-6 0-6 0-6 0-6 
 2 0-6 0-6 0-6 0-6 0-6 1-7 
 3 0-6 0-6 0-6 0-6 2-8 3-9 
        
 4 0-6 0-6 0-6 2-8 4-10 6-12 
Zone A 5 0-6 0-6 1-7 4-10 6-12 9-15 
 6 0-6 1-7 2-8 6-12 9-15 12-18 
        
 7 0-6 2-8 4-10 8-14 12-18 15-21 
 8 0-6 4-10 6-12 10-16 15-21 18-24 
 9 4-10 6-12 8-14 12-18 18-24 21-27 
Zone B        
 10 6-12 8-14 10-16 15-21 21-27 24-30 
Zone C 11 8-14 10-16 12-18 18-24 24-30 27-33 
 12 10-16 12-18 15-21 21-27 27-33 30-37 
        
 13 12-18 15-21 18-24 24-30 30-37 33-41 
 14 15-21 18-24 21-27 27-33 33-41 37-46 
 15 18-24 21-27 24-30 30-37 37-46 41-51 
        
 16 21-27 24-30 27-33 33-41 41-51 46-57 
 17 24-30 27-33 30-37 37-46 46-57 51-63 
 18 27-33 30-37 33-41 41-51 51-63 57-71 
        
 19 30-37 33-41 37-46 46-57 57-71 63-78 
 20 33-41 37-46 41-51 51-63 63-78 70-87 
 21 37-46 41-51 46-57 57-71 70-87 77-96 
        
 22 41-51 46-57 51-63 63-78 77-96 84-105 
 23 46-57 51-63 57-71 70-87 84-105 92-115 
 24 51-63 57-71 63-78 77-96 92-115 100-125 
        
 25 57-71 63-78 70-87 84-105 100-125 110-137 
 26 63-78 70-87 78-97 92-115 110-137 120-150 
 27 70-87 78-97 87-108 100-125 120-150 130-162 
Zone D        
 28 78-97 87-108 97-121 110-137 130-162 140-175 
 29 87-108 97-121 108-135 121-151 140-175 151-188 
 30 97-121 108-135 121-151 135-168 151-188 168-210 
        
 31 108-135 121-151 135-168 151-188 168-210 188-235 
 32 121-151 135-168 151-188 168-210 188-235 210-262 
 33 135-168 151-188 168-210 188-235 210-262 235-293 
        
 34 151-188 168-210 188-235 210-262 235-293 262-327 
 35 168-210 188-235 210-262 235-293 262-327 292-365 
 36 188-235 210-262 235-293 262-327 292-365 324-405 
        
 37 210-262 235-293 262-327 292-365 324-405 360-life 
 38 235-293 262-327 292-365 324-405 360-life 360-life 
 39 262-327 292-365 324-405 360-life 360-life 360-life 
        
 40 292-365 324-405 360-life 360-life 360-life 360-life 
 41 324-405 360-life 360-life 360-life 360-life 360-life 
 42 360-life 360-life 360-life 360-life 360-life 360-life 
 43 Life Life Life life life Life 
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Table A1:  Means and Proportions (Standard Errors in Parentheses) 
Variable Mean or Proportion All 
Crimes 
Total Prison Sentence 
 
47.53 
(98.45) 
Jail Time Given 
 
.809 
(.392) 
Sentence Within Range 
 
.677 
(.475) 
Downward Departure 
 
.315 
(.490) 
Downward Departure (Substantial 
Assistance) 
.192 
(.393) 
Downward Departure (Judge 
Initiated) 
.123 
(.332) 
Upward Departure 
 
.0082 
(.0923) 
Bottom of Range 
 
.333 
(.477) 
Age 
 
34.67 
(10.38) 
Male 
 
.847 
(.357) 
Female 
 
.153 
(.359) 
White 
 
.367 
(.479) 
Black 
 
.302 
(.459) 
Hispanic 
 
.303 
(.459) 
Asian 
 
.022 
(.146) 
Other 
 
.018 
(.133) 
Citizen 
 
.741 
(.438) 
Jury 
 
.071 
(.252) 
Bench 
 
.00085 
(.0292) 
Less than High School 
 
.518 
(.498) 
High School 
 
.413 
(.492) 
College 
 
.054 
(.225) 
Advanced Degree 
 
.018 
(.134) 
No Dependents 
 
.377 
(.484) 
One Dependent 
 
.189 
(.392) 
Two Dependents  
 
.175 
(.380) 
Three or more Dep. .255 
(.425) 
N  371,324 
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Table A2 [Figure 1]:  Downward Departures (No Substantial Assistance) 
 
 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
1994   0.020** 
(.004)
.015** 
(.005)
.14** 
(.01)
1995 .030** 
(.009)
.019* 
(.009)
.015 
(.008)
1996 .053** 
(.015)
.036** 
(.011)
.032** 
(.010)
1997 .083** 
(.018)
.048** 
(.011)
.050** 
(.013)
1998 .10** 
(.032)
.054** 
(.015)
.050** 
(.016)
1999 .11** 
(.032) 
.063** 
(.023) 
.056* 
(.023)
2000 .12** 
(.030)
.064** 
(.021)
.055** 
(.020)
2001 .13** 
(.032)
.078** 
(.024)
.070** 
(.023)
Constant .10** 
(.014)
-.11 
(29.)
.25 
(.32) 
District Dummies No Yes Yes 
Offense Type 
Dummies 
No Yes Yes 
Sentencing Table 
Dummies 
No Yes Yes 
Offender  
Demographic 
Variables 
No No Yes 
R-squared .0128 .1982 0.1984 
N 282,310 281,172 261,736 
All substantial assistance departures and sentences in the A range of the sentencing table have been removed from 
the data.  Sentencing table dummies are entered as a dummy variable for each offense level, a dummy variable for 
each criminal history category, and an interaction term between offense level and criminal history category.  
Dummies for Theft offenses through obstruction of justice offenses are included but not reported (violent offenses 
are the excluded category).  [state how offenses are broken up] Offender demographic variables are dummies for 
race (black, Hispanic, Asian, other);  citizenship status; education dummies (high school, college, graduate 
school); dummies for number of dependents (zero, one, two); age (entered as a quadratic). In Models 2-4, statutory 
minimum sentence, if any, are included.  In models 3 and 4, disposition mechanism (jury, bench trial) are also 
included.  (OLS coefficients, Huber-White robust standard errors adjusted for clustering by district in parenthesis.)  
**coefficient significant at less than 1% level, *coefficient significant at 5% level or less.   
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Table A3 [Figure 2]:  Downward Departures (No Immigration Offenses) 
 
 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
1994   .020** 
(.004)
.018** 
(.005)
.016** 
(.005)
1995 .023** 
(.007)
.021** 
(.009)
.019* 
(.008)
1996 .030** 
(.008)
.026** 
(.008)
.024** 
(.007)
1997 .055** 
(.013)
.040** 
(.011)
.040** 
(.013)
1998 .066** 
(.021)
.042** 
(.013)
.040** 
(.013)
1999 .077* 
(.032)
.051** 
(.017)
.045* 
(.017)
2000 .075** 
(.024)
.053** 
(.014)
.045** 
(.014)
2001 .085** 
(.028)
.063** 
(.017)
.055** 
(.016)
Constant .10** 
(.01)
-.13* 
(.062)
.04 
(.04)
District Dummies No Yes Yes 
Offense Type Dummies No Yes Yes 
Sentencing Table 
Dummies 
No Yes Yes 
Offender Demographic 
Variables 
No No Yes 
R-squared .0064 .1723 .1799 
N 242,252 241,280  231,954 
All substantial assistance departures and sentences in the A range of the sentencing table have been removed from 
the data.  Sentencing table dummies are entered as a dummy variable for each offense level, a dummy variable for 
each criminal history category, and an interaction term between offense level and criminal history category.  
Dummies for Theft offenses through obstruction of justice offenses are included but not reported (violent offenses 
are the excluded category).  [state how offenses are broken up] Offender demographic variables are dummies for 
race (black, Hispanic, Asian, other);  citizenship status; education dummies (high school, college, graduate 
school); dummies for number of dependents (zero, one, two); age (entered as a quadratic). In Models 2-4, statutory 
minimum sentence, if any, are included.  In models 3 and 4, disposition mechanism (jury, bench trial) are also 
included.  (OLS coefficients, Huber-White robust standard errors adjusted for clustering by district in parenthesis.)  
**coefficient significant at less than 1% level, *coefficient significant at 5% level or less.   
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Table A4 [Figure 3]:  Downward Departures (No Border Districts) 
 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
1994   .015** 
(.003)
.010** 
(.00)
.010* 
(.004)
1995 .021** 
(.007)
.013 
(.008)
.011 
(.008)
1996 .031** 
(.010)
.021* 
(.008)
 .020* 
(.009)
1997 .053** 
(.013)
.038** 
(.011)
.037** 
(.013)
1998 .051** 
(.011)
.033** 
(.011)
.030* 
(.012)
1999 .053** 
(.011)
.035** 
(.008)
.029** 
(.012)
2000 .063** 
(.012)
.039** 
(.007)
.033** 
(.007)
2001 .068** 
(.020)
.046** 
(.013)
.039** 
(.006)
Constant .092** 
(.012)
-.14**  
(.04)
.0016 
(.052)
District Dummies No Yes Yes 
Offense Type 
Dummies 
No Yes Yes 
Sentencing Table 
Dummies 
No Yes Yes 
Offender 
Demographic 
Variables 
No No Yes 
R-squared .0045 .0761 .0877 
N 230,400 229,403 216,952  
All substantial assistance departures and sentences in the A range of the sentencing table have been removed from 
the data.  Sentencing table dummies are entered as a dummy variable for each offense level, a dummy variable for 
each criminal history category, and an interaction term between offense level and criminal history category.  
Dummies for Theft offenses through obstruction of justice offenses are included but not reported (violent offenses 
are the excluded category).  [state how offenses are broken up] Offender demographic variables are dummies for 
race (black, Hispanic, Asian, other);  citizenship status; education dummies (high school, college, graduate 
school); dummies for number of dependents (zero, one, two); age (entered as a quadratic). In Models 2-4, statutory 
minimum sentence, if any, are included.  In models 3 and 4, disposition mechanism (jury, bench trial) are also 
included.  (OLS coefficients, Huber-White robust standard errors adjusted for clustering by district in parenthesis.)  
**coefficient significant at less than 1% level, *coefficient significant at 5% level or less.   
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Table A5 [Figure 4]:  Downward Departures (No Plea Bargains) 
 
 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
1994   .016** 
(.005)
.013* 
(.005)
.012* 
(.005)
1995 .037** 
(.009)
.018* 
(.009)
.014 
(.008)
1996 .050** 
(.015)
.034** 
(.011)
.031** 
(.011)
1997 .077** 
(.018)
.049** 
(.012)
.052** 
(.014)
1998 .084** 
(.023)
.051** 
(.015)
.049** 
(.016)
1999 .10** 
(.033)
.062* 
(.024)
.057* 
(.024)
2000 .10** 
(.027)
.066** 
(.023)
.057* 
(.022)
2001 .11** 
(.032)
.078** 
(.026)
.070** 
(.025)
Constant .080** 
(.006)
-.22 
(.34)
.48 
(.46)
District Dummies No Yes Yes 
Offense Type 
Dummies 
No Yes Yes 
Sentencing Table 
Dummies 
No Yes Yes 
Offender 
Demographic 
Variables 
No No Yes 
R-squared .0118 .1418 .1481 
N 272,100 270,989  253,183 
All substantial assistance departures and sentences in the A range of the sentencing table have been removed from 
the data.  Sentencing table dummies are entered as a dummy variable for each offense level, a dummy variable for 
each criminal history category, and an interaction term between offense level and criminal history category.  
Dummies for Theft offenses through obstruction of justice offenses are included but not reported (violent offenses 
are the excluded category).  [state how offenses are broken up] Offender demographic variables are dummies for 
race (black, Hispanic, Asian, other);  citizenship status; education dummies (high school, college, graduate 
school); dummies for number of dependents (zero, one, two); age (entered as a quadratic). In Models 2-4, statutory 
minimum sentence, if any, are included.  In models 3 and 4, disposition mechanism (jury, bench trial) are also 
included.  (OLS coefficients, Huber-White robust standard errors adjusted for clustering by district in parenthesis.)  
**coefficient significant at less than 1% level, *coefficient significant at 5% level or less.   
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Table A6 [Figure 5]:  Total Prison Sentences 
 
 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
1994   -.31 
(.83) 
-.21 
(.29) 
-.45 
(.28) 
1995 -.79 
(.48) 
-.74* 
(.29) 
-.68* 
(.29) 
1996 -1.28** 
(.47) 
-.98** 
(.28) 
-1.22** 
(.29) 
1997 -4.03** 
(.46) 
-.28 
(.28) 
-.31 
(.28) 
1998 -2.90** 
(.45) 
-.55* 
(.27) 
-.60* 
(.28) 
1999 -3.42** 
(.44) 
-1.62** 
(.27) 
-1.45** 
(.27) 
2000 -3.47** 
(.44) 
-1.11** 
(.28) 
-.88** 
(.26) 
2001 -3.29** 
(2.34) 
-1.25** 
(.27) 
-.51 
(.27) 
Constant 49.18** 
(1.99) 
24.52** 
(3.02) 
25.01** 
(4.14) 
Joint test of year effects  .0001 .0001 
District Dummies  Yes Yes 
Offense Type Dummies  Yes Yes 
Sentencing Table 
Dummies 
 Yes Yes 
Offender Demographic 
Variables 
 No Yes 
N 400,438 399,997 371,324 
Sentencing table dummies are entered as a dummy variable for each offense level, a dummy variable for each 
criminal history category, and an interaction term between offense level and criminal history category.  Offender 
demographic variables are dummies for race (black, Hispanic, Asian, other);  citizenship status; education 
dummies (high school, college, graduate school); dummies for number of dependents (zero, one, two); age 
(entered as a quadratic). In Models 2 and 3, statutory minimum sentence, if any, and disposition mechanism (jury, 
bench trial) are also included.  (Model 1 reports raw averages, Tobit coefficients in models 2 and 3, Huber-White 
robust standard errors adjusted for clustering by district in parenthesis.)  **coefficient significant at less than 1% 
level, *coefficient significant at 5% level or less.   
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Table A7 [Figure 6]:  Total Prison Sentences in Departure Cases 
 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
1994   -.97 
 (1.44) 
.81 
(.85) 
.99 
(.83) 
1995 -1.29 
 (1.45) 
.48    
(.85) 
.53    
(.84) 
1996 -.61 
 (1.41) 
1.26    
(.82) 
.71    
(.81) 
1997 -1.49 
 (1.33) 
3.08** 
(.78) 
1.86* 
(.78) 
1998 -2.98** 
 (1.26) 
4.21** 
(.79) 
3.10* 
(1.21) 
1999 -2.06 
 (1.26) 
3.42** 
(.74) 
2.59** 
(.74) 
2000 -2.25 
 (1.25) 
2.79** 
(.74) 
2.35** 
(.74) 
2001 -2.28 
 (1.23) 
3.31** 
(.73) 
3.06** 
(.83) 
Constant 36.11** 
 (1.05) 
6.94 
(11.01) 
8.20 
(12.01) 
Joint test of year 
effects (p-value) 
.3325 .0001 .0012 
District Dummies  Yes Yes 
Offense Type 
Dummies 
 Yes Yes 
Sentencing Table 
Dummies 
 Yes Yes 
Offender 
Demographic 
Variables 
 No Yes 
Sample Size 37,364 37,140  34,885 
Sentencing table dummies are entered as a dummy variable for each offense level, a dummy variable for each 
criminal history category, and an interaction term between offense level and criminal history category.  Offender 
demographic variables are dummies for race (black, Hispanic, Asian, other);  citizenship status; education 
dummies (high school, college, graduate school); dummies for number of dependents (zero, one, two); age 
(entered as a quadratic). In Models 2 and 3, statutory minimum sentence, if any, and disposition mechanism (jury, 
bench trial) are also included.  (Model 1 reports raw averages, Tobit coefficients in Models 2 and 3, Huber-White 
robust standard errors adjusted for clustering by district in parenthesis.)  **coefficient significant at less than 1% 
level, *coefficient significant at 5% level or less.   
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